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.. Who Pays FHA-VA Discount Points?" 
By Donald Guy 
Dr. Guy is an assistant professor 
of real estate and land use eco-
nomics in the College of Business 
Administration at the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha. 
The purpose of this study was to 
measure empirically the extent to which 
FHA and VA discount points are passed 
on to residential buyers in Omaha, 
Nebraska, and to compare the results 
with previous studies in Columbus, Ohio, 
and Lubbock, Texas. 
A controversy exists as to who actually 
pays discount points on FHA and VA 
mortgages. These mongage programs 
were established by federal law and have 
interest rate ceilings set by the federal 
government. The ceiling rate can be 
adjusted up or down but has traditionally 
been kept below the market interest rate 
on comparable conventional mongages. 
Federal officials intentionally keep the 
ceiling below the market rate. The 
justification given is that this will assist 
moderate income families to purchase 
homes and will help restrain interest rates 
on conventional mongages. Private lend-
ing institutions that ongmate these 
mortgages require that discount points be 
paid at closing in order to raise the yield 
on the mortgages up to the yield on 
conventional mongages.1 Since the lend-
ers are prohibited by law from charging 
discounts to the buyer, the seller must 
pay these charges to the lending institu-
tion in order for the buyer to receive the 
loan and complete the sales transaction. 
FHA/VA Buyer Pays More 
Since the requirement to pay discounts 
reduces the net return on the sale, a 
rational seller would be expected to 
charge a higher price to an FHA or VA 
buyer. For example, if the seller antici-
pated that lenders would require four 
discount points (where one point equals 1 
percent of the loan amount) and the 
seller wanted to net $50,000 on the sale, 
he might list the house at $52,000. If the 
seller accepted an offer at $52,000 which 
required a $52,000 VA loan, he would 
have to pay the lender $2,080 in discounts 
in order for the buyer to get the loan (at 
four discount points). In effect, the seller 
would reduce the net amount received by 
$80 while the buyer would really be 
paying $2,000 of the discount in the 
form of a higher purchase price. The 
seller would be as well off with a contract 
requiring conventional financing at a 
selling price of $49,920. 
Ideally, the seller would like to raise 
the price to the FHA/VA buyer by the 
amount of the discount in order to 
receive the same net sale price as would 
be received from a conventional buyer. 
This would require that the seller be 
aware of the amount of the discount 
prior to accepting an offer (and thus prior 
to the buyer making a loan application to 
the mongage lender). The seller is funher 
constrained in passing on the discount by 
the requirement that the propeny must 
be appraised at the contract price or 
higher for the buyer to obtain FHA or 
VA financing. (If the appraised value is 
less than the contract price, the buyer has 
the option of making a larger down 
payment and completing the trans-
action or of voiding the purchase agree-
ment). Even if the seller knows how 
much would have to be added in order to 
pass on all of the discount, the seller must 
be concerned about what price could be 
justified by an appraisal or risk having the 
contract voided after the appraisal. 
Thus, the controversy arises as to what 
ponion of the discount points will 
actually be passed on to the buyer in the 
form of a higher selling price. A knowledge 
of what portion of the discounts are 
added to the selling price would obviously 
be of interest to potential buyers and 
sellers as well as to real estate brokers, 
salespersons, and appraisers. While the 
controversy is of long standing, only 
recently have empirical studies been 
undertaken to determine whether or not 
discounts are passed on to the buyer. 
Ohio Study 
The first empirical study was done 
by Zerbst and Brueggeman (1978, 1978). 
They collected cross section data based 
on a sample of 276 sales through the 
multiple listing service in Columbus, 
Ohio, in June 1973. They ran a regression 
analysis using a ratio of sale price to 
asking price as the dependent variable but 
did not explain their decision to do this. 
The rationale would seem to be that most 
sellers build points into their asking price. 
If a potential buyer is going to make an 
offer which included conventional financ-
ing, a knowledgeable buyer would offer 
less than the asking price. An offer that 
reduced the asking price by no more than 
the amount of points built into that price 
should be readily acceptable to the seller. 
If the potential buyer will require FHA or 
VA financing, the buyer has less bargain-
ing leverage and must offer the asking 
price or, at least, closer to the asking 
price than the conventional buyer. Many 
other circumstances would also affect the 
relative bargaining position of the buyer 
and the seller. 
To the extent that this model focuses 
on the pricing expectations of the seller, 
this is a reasonable way to approach the 
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question of sellers anticipating the 
requirement to pay FHA or VA discount 
points. The full regression equation is 
shown below: 
SP/AP = .96 + .0227FHA + .0306VA 
(59.71) (3.84) (5.36) 
+ .0125 L/V- .002 Time 
(.64) (3.21) 
R2 = .21 
The term SP/AP is the ratio of selling 
price to asking price. For example, if 
a seller listed his house at $52,000 but 
accepted a contract for $50,000, the ratio 
would be 50,000/52,000 or .962. The 
FHA and VA terms are represented by 
dummy variables which are assigned a 
value of 1 for sales using that type of 
financing and 0 for sales with other types 
of financing. The L/V term is the loan to 
value ratio where value is represented by 
selling price. For example, if a buyer 
bought a $50,000 house with a conven-
tional mortgage that required a $10,000 
downpayment, the loan to value ratio 
would be $40,000 (mortgage amount)/ 
$50,000 (value) or .8 for that sale. The 
time variable in this model represents the 
number of days between listing and 
selling the property (time on market). 
Regression Analysis 
The results of the regression analysis 
indicate that 42.5 percent of FHA points 
and 56 percent of VA po ints are passed 
on to the buyer in the form of a higher 
selling price. 2 This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that sellers build discount 
points into the asking price. The coeffi-
cient on the time variable is negative 
which means that the longer the house is 
on the market, the lower the ratio of sale 
price to asking price. This conclusion 
could be interpreted as saying that 
"overpriced" houses take longer to sell 
(or the longer the house is on the market, 
the more the seller is amenable to accept-
ing a lower offer). The t ratios are shown 
in parentheses below each term. All of 
the t ratios are statistically significant (at 
the .05 level) except for the L/V term. 3 
The value of R2 indicates that 21 percent 
of the variation in the SP/AP ratio is 
explained by the regression equation. 
The value of R 2 would be expected to 
be low because of the many other 
possible influences on asking price and 
selling price. 
Texas Study 
Karl Gunterman (1978, 1979) did a 
similar study for Lubbock, Texas, but 
examined only FHA sales. He collected 
sales data on 2,408 houses that were 
sold during the period 1970-1975. He ran 
a regression analysis using sale price as the 
dependent variable, and the results are 
shown below: 
SP = 9864 + 12.6 Size- 346.0 Age 
(33 .2) (69.4) (52.7) 
-163.5 Time+ 474.5 FHA 
(57.1) (4.1) 
R2 = .83 
The size variable is the square foot area of 
the house, age is the chronological age of 
the house as of the year of sale, time is 
the number of months from the month of 
the sale until the end of 1975, and the 
FHA variable is a dummy variable which 
takes a value of 1 for FHA sales and 0 for 
other financing methods. The time 
variable was used to account for a time 
trend in sales price since the data included 
sales over a five year period. The results 
indicate that a purchaser paid approxi-
mately $4 7 5 more for a house if the 
purchase was financed FHA rather than 
with conventional financing, other 
influences held constant. Based on the 
average discount paid over the study 
period, this represents a pass through of 
about 73 percent of the FHA discounts. 
This result is consistent with the earlier 
study, but it indicates a larger proportion 
of the discount is passed through. 
Gunterman extended the an-alysis in 
Lwu ways. Since the data covered a five 
year period and discounts charged vary 
over time, he added a series of dummy 
variables representing different numbers 
of points depending on the quarter in 
which the sale was closed and the number 
of discount points being charged at the 
end of the quarter. This analysis indicated 
that the greater the discount, the larger 
the proportion of the discount passed to 
the buyer. 
Gunterman also divided the data into 
three price categories and repeated the 
regression analysis with each group.4 He 
concluded that FHA points were not 
passed through in the lowest price category 
and that a greater proportion of the 
discounts were passed through on sales in 
the higher priced homes as compared to 
the middle priced range. 
Omaha Study 
In order to estimate the extent to 
which FHA and VA discounts are passed 
to buyers in Omaha, data were collected 
on a sample of 611 sales that took place 
in the period January to March, 1977. 
This period was chosen because mortgage 
interest rates were stable during this 
period and the ceiling interest rate on 
FHA/VA loans was unchanged. All of the 
sales were arranged through brokers, and 
only houses with sale prices of $4 5 ,000 
and below were considered so that all of 
the sales would have been eligible for 
FHA financing. Data were collected on 
listing price, sale price, time on the 
market, square feet in the house, number 
of bedrooms, chronological age of the 
house, and financing terms. 5 Some of 
these data are reported in Tables 14. The 
data there indicate that the average listing 
price was $29,199, but the amount 
ranged from $3,000 to $48,950. The 
mean sale price averaged $2 7,972; the 
average FHA sale was $23,470, while 
V A-financed sales averaged $2 7,292 and 
conventional loans in the sample averaged 
$32,263. The average ratio of the selling 
price to the asking price ranged from 
.9707 for FHA homes to .9534 for 
homes financed by conventional loans. 
A regression was run using the Zerbst 
and Brueggeman model (except for loan 
to value ratio as previously explained). 
Time on the market was found to be not 
statistically significant and was dropped 
from the analysis . The resulting regression 
results are shown below.6 
SP/AP = .94 + .0306 FHA+ .0264 VA 
(246.82) (4.23) (3.64) 
R2 = .04 
The t statistics are shown in parentheses 
below each term. These results are con-
sistent with the Zerbst and Brueggeman 
study but would indicate that more of 
the discounts are passed on in FHA than 
in VA sales. The percent passed through 
was higher for both with 96 percent of 
FHA and 80 percent of VA points passed 
on to buyers.7 To the extent that the 
model focuses on seller expectations, the 
difference could reflect differences in 
expectations in the two markets. 
A second regression was run using 
two variables not included in the previous 
studies. As complete age data weren't 
available, distance to the central bus!ness 
district was used as a crude proxy. Houses 
closest to the CBD would generally be the 
oldest houses with age decreasing with 
distance from the CBD. The second 
variable added was quality as measured 
by price per square foot. Measured in this 
way, quality could combine several 
features such as better materials used in 
construction, better condition, or more 
built-in appliances. The results of the 
second regression are shown below: 
SP/AP = .88 + .0366 FHA+ .0281VA 
(85.72) (5.19) (4.02) 
+ .0020 Qual. + .0029 Dist. 
(5.61) (1.91) 
R2 = .12 
The coefficient on the quality variable 
has a positive sign and is statistically 
significant. This means that the seller of a 
higher quality house will sell at closer to 
the asking price than would the seller of a 
lower quality house. This result is 
reasonable in that the condition of the 
house would be expected to affect the 
relative bargaining power of the seller. 
The distance variable (as a proxy for age) 
has the expected sign. The greater the 
distance from the CBD (the newer the 
house) the closer the sale price to the 
asking price. The coefficient on the 
distance variable is not quite signifi-
cant at the .05 level (critical t value is 
1.96) . The R2 is substantially higher in 
the second regression. The coefficients on 
the FHA and VA variables are slighdy 
higher (and statistically significant) but 
are of the same order of magnitude as in 
the regression model which incorporates 
only the financial terms. This lends 
additional support to the conclusions of 
the first regression model. 
Conclusions 
What conclusions can be drawn from 
these three studies? Gunterman studied 
only FHA financing. His analysis pro-
duced much higher R 2 than either of the 
other studies, but this would be expected 
since he was using selling price as his 
dependent variable. He also included size 
and age of house which were not directly 
included in the other two studies. He also 
used data collected for a five year period 
and thus had to take out the time trend 
in prices. The other studies used a ratio of 
selling price to asking price which would 
seem to be a better way to approach the 
problem of seller expectation. The Zerbst 
and Brueggeman study also included loan 
to value ratio which was not statistically 
significant. Zerbst and Brueggeman found 
time on market to be significant, but this 
was not found to be significant in the 
Omaha study. 
While the three studies indicate 
different amounts of points passed 
through to sellers, they provide strong 
support for the contention that sub-
stantial portions of the discounts are paid 
indirecdy by buyers in the form of a 
higher selling price. A comparison of the 
Omaha and Columbus results suggests 
that the higher the discount, the smaller 
the percentage of the discount that will 
be p assed on to the buyer. This is the 
opposite of the conclusion drawn by 
Gunterman. A rational seller would be 
expected to pass o n as much of the 
discount as possible. As noted previously, 
the appraisal requirement would effec-
tively limit the total number of dollars 
that could be passed through on the sale. 
For these reasons, the larger discounts 
logically are less fully passed through. 
Another sample could be taken when 
discount requirements were higher than 
those in the Columbus study better 
to establish this result. There are some 
limits to the statistical analysis of this 
problem. If one is primarily interested 
in knowing how knowledgeable sellers 
are about discount points, a better 
research methodology might be to survey 
homeowners who have listed their houses 
for sale and ask them if they knew what 
discounts are and what level of discounts 
were being charged by local lenders at 
that time. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 One discount point equals one percent of 
the mortgage amount. The number of points 
charged for a particular mortgage depends 
primarily on the spread between the cei ling 
rate and the market interest rate. Discounting 
raises the effective yield to the lender. 
2 At the time o f the study, local lenders 
charged an average of 5.75 discount points 
for FHA and VA loans. Using mean asking 
price, mean selling price, and FHA and VA 
mean loan to value ratios from the sample 
data. Zerbst and Brueggeman estimate that, 
on the average, 42.5 percent of FHA discounts 
and 56 percent of VA discounts were passed on 
t o buyers in t he form of higher selling prices. 
3The low va lue of this statistic for the L/V 
term indicates that the probable range of values 
for the coefficient i ncl udcs the volue of zero. 
Therefore. whether this variable should have 
been included in the analysis is questionable. 
4The three price cat egories used by 
Gunterman are $5,000-$14,999, $15,000-
$24,999, and $25,000 and above. Most of his 
data are for sales below $40,000. The maxi-
mum FHA mortgage was $33,000 until August 
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1974 when the maximum was raised to 
$45,000. 
5The loan amount was not available, so the 
loan to value ratio used by Zerbst and 
Brueggeman was not calculated. This llariable 
was not found to be statistically significant in 
the Zerbst and Brueggeman study. The age 
of many houses was shown as o lder. No age 
was recorded tor these t ransactions. If age had 
been included as a va riabl e. these sales would 
have appeared as zero, wh ich would distort 
the analysis. Thus, age was not included as a 
va riable in the Omaha study. 
6The value of R2• while quite low, is 
statistically significant. While the regressi on 
equation explains only a small part of the 
variation in the ratio of selling price to asking 
price. the analysis does indicate that the ratio 
varies systematically depending on how the 
transaction was f inanced. 
7 The regression results indicate that the 
ratio of sel li ng price to asking price is .0306 
higher if the sale was financed FHA and .0264 
higher if the sale was financed VA. The average 
discount during the period studied was 3.5 
points. Applying the methodology from the 
Zerbst and Brueggeman study to the Omaha data 
produces estimates of 96 percent of FHA and 
80 percent of VA points passed on t o the 
buyer in the form of a higher selling price. 
TABLE 1 
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Mean Lowest Highest 
Listing 
Price $29,199 $3,000 $48,950 
Sale Price $27,972 $1,500 $45,000 
Square 
Feet 1,336 138 2.460 
Time on 
Market 57.25 1 421 
TABLE 2 
NUMBER OF BEDROOMS AND SE LLING PRICE 
Price Range 1 2 3 4&5 Total 
Under $10,000 4 20 7 5 36 
$10,000-20,000 4 41 43 21 109 
$20 ,000-30 ,000 0 33 120 29 182 
$30 ,000-40 ,000 0 2 193 25 220 
$40 ,000-45 ,000 0 0 52 12 64 
- - - -
-
Total 8 96 415 92 611 
TAB LE 3 
FINANCING METHOD AND SELLING PRICE 
Price Range FHA VA CONV.~/ CONV. PMI Other Total 
Under $10.000 7 6 3 0 20 36 
$10,000-20,000 42 24 11 8 24 109 
$20,000,30,000 57 51 31 20 23 182 
$30,000-40,000 25 42 58 51 44 220 
$40 .000-45,000 2 9 27 16 10 64 
- -
- -
Total 133 132 130 95 121 611 
~/ Conventional loans require at least 20 percent down. Conventional loans with less 
than 20 percent down require private mortgage insurance and are shown as CONV-PMI. 
Other f inancing includes cash sales. assumptions, and land contracts. 
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This methodology requires a series of steps. 
The regression coefficient times the average 
asking price equals the dollars passed through. 
The average selling price times the average 
FHA (or VA) loan to value ratio equals the 
average loan. The average loan times the average 
discount equals the amount of the discount. 
The dollars passed through divided by the 
amount of the discount equals the proportion 
of the discount points passed through to the 
buyer. 
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TABLE 4 
FINANCING METHOD, 
MEAN SELLING PRICE, 
AND MEAN SP/AP 
Mean 
Method Selling Mean Sale Price Financing Price Asking Price 
FHA $23,470 .9707 
VA $27,292 .9665 
CONV $32,263 .9534 
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